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On February 24-25, 2006 an international workshop on “Regional and 
International Currency Arrangements” was held in Vienna. It was co-sponsored by 
the Oesterreichische Nationalbank and the Bank of Greece, and jointly organized 
by Eduard Hochreiter and George Tavlas. Academic economists and researchers 
from central banks and international organizations presented and discussed current 
research, and reviewed and assessed the past experience with, and the future 
challenges of, international currency arrangements. A number of papers and the 
contributions by the discussants presented at this workshop are being made 
available to a broader audience in the Working Paper series of the Bank of Greece 
and simultaneously also in the Working Paper Series of the Oesterreichische 
Nationalbank. The papers and the discussants’ comments will be published in the 
journal,  International Economics and Economic Policy. Here we present the 
seventh of these Working Papers. (The previous six were issued as Bank of Greece 
Working Papers No. 39 to 44.) In addition to the paper by John Williamson, the 
Working Paper also contains the contribution of the discussant, Marc Flandreau 
   
 
 

































A paper presented at a workshop organized by the Bank of Greece and the 
Oesterreichische Nationalbank on 24-25 February 2006 in Vienna and to be published in 
International Economics and Economic Policy. The author is indebted to Edwin Truman, 
Richard Cooper, Randy Henning, workshop participants, and those at a seminar at the 
University of Warwick for comments on previous drafts. Copyright Institute for 
International Economics: All rights reserved.   7
                                                
There is widespread agreement that the major industrial countries do, will, and 
should utilize macroeconomic frameworks embodying inflation targeting (IT) and 
floating exchange rates. Some economists wish that those central banks (notably the Fed 
and the ECB) that have still not formally adopted IT would hasten to do so, but in both 
these cases the continued control of inflation is such a high-priority objective that one 
may doubt whether it would make an enormous amount of difference. Intellectual 
differences on the other underpinning of current macroeconomic policy, namely floating 
exchange rates, are in practice probably more important. Acceptance that the central bank 
is better off without a commitment to defend any particular exchange rate (which is my 
definition of a floating rate) is consistent with three quite different interpretations of how 
the international monetary system should be organized: 
•  On the basis of an obligation of free floating, meaning that there should be an 
obligation not to intervene substantively
1 (except, presumably, for countries that 
firmly fix their exchange rates). 
•  Ad hoc floating, in which there are essentially no rules (except that a country 
should not “manipulate” its exchange rate, whatever that may mean
2). 
•  Managed floating, in which the principles of management are clearly enunciated 
and the parameters are publicly announced. 
This paper makes the case for floating to be managed, according to a well-
specified set of rules that prohibit intervention and other policies intended to push the 
exchange rate away from an internationally agreed norm. Conversely, they would allow 
(but not compel) intervention that was designed to push a rate toward its agreed 
international norm. These agreed international norms would be the reference (exchange) 
rates, and accordingly the system is called a reference rate system. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The next section describes the 
alternative versions of floating in somewhat more detail, and explains why I am less than 
enthused about some of them. The following section discusses the charge that 
 
1   I define non-substantive intervention as encompassing reserve changes as a result of the government’s 
own transactions and smoothing intervention. 
2   The best attempt to give this concept some meaning has been made by my colleague Morris Goldstein in 
Truman (2006), but his proposed answer does not seem to have resonated in official circles.   8
enunciation of a set of reference rates would make no difference to exchange rate 
outcomes. This is followed by a consideration of the issue of determining an appropriate 
set of reference rates.  
 
Three versions of a floating rate system 
The version of floating normally taken for granted by economists is a system of 
freely floating exchange rates. At times economists have worried about whether it is 
possible to have a pure system of floating rates, because the authorities normally have 
some of their own transactions in the foreign exchange market and the timing of them 
might in principle influence the path of exchange rates. One might seek to counteract this 
by requiring that government purchases or sales of foreign exchange be spread out evenly 
over time and preannounced for several days or weeks in advance. However, such 
intervention is hardly likely to have a pronounced influence on exchange rates, and so the 
alternative is just to ignore it. A system that incorporated an obligation of free floating 
could simply allow both intervention designed to finance government transactions and 
smoothing intervention that is intended to minimize the impact of temporary blips 
without any intention of influencing the level of the rate. There would be a simple test of 
whether intervention was “non-substantive” (i.e. just aimed at smoothing the rate and 
financing government transactions), which is that the level of reserves should stay 
roughly constant over time (or at least increase no faster than can be accounted for by 
interest on the reserves or a trend buildup of reserves). 
  The disadvantage that some of us see in a system of floating exchange rates is that 
they give noisy signals of one of the most crucial macroeconomic prices, namely the 
exchange rate. The Meese and Rogoff (1983) finding that a random walk out-performs 
any economic model in predicting the exchange rate at short horizons, which has never 
been decisively overturned, is proof enough that the signal is a noisy one. If this were a 
question solely of short-run volatility, then one might overlook it, because while a few of 
the many studies devoted to examining the impact of exchange-rate volatility on the real 
economy claim to have found a negative impact, the overwhelming impression they leave 
is that any effects are small. But that still leaves misalignments, defined as large and 
persistent deviations of the exchange rate from some concept of equilibrium, which have   9
also been large on occasion (as anyone familiar with the exchange markets is aware), and 
which some of us have long felt to constitute the major problem. 
  So long as the exchange rate between currencies whose value is left to the market 
(like the dollar and the euro) can vary by more than 50 percent in an era of price stability, 
it seems reasonable to ask whether performance could not be improved by governments 
playing a more active role in the foreign exchange market.  
  The second possible international regime is one of laissez-faire. Anything goes. A 
non-system, as several economists termed the successor to Bretton Woods when it was 
first announced to the world. There are no rules, except the famous injunction not to 
“manipulate” exchange rates. Countries may float if they want to, or fix their currencies 
in terms of anything else they choose (except gold!), or run any intermediate regime they 
like, no matter if (like the adjustable peg) it has repeatedly proved a disaster in the past. 
They can run a quasi-currency board if they prefer, even if it promises to bring disaster to 
their people, and the IMF may underwrite their idiocy in the name of national sovereignty 
until the crisis hits. 
  The disadvantages of this regime are becoming ever more evident as the global 
imbalances grow larger with no sign of reversal, despite a clear enough intellectual 
understanding of what needs to be done to reign them in.
3 Not only do the present 
arrangements lack any disciplines that might avoid the escalation of imbalances, but they 
breed conflicts such as the threat of protectionist legislation by the U.S. Congress aimed 
at China unless it appreciates the RMB. One could surely wish for an international 
system that would pressure countries into seeking and adopting a set of policies that are 
consistent with a satisfactory global outcome and that would outlaw attempts by 
individual countries to bully others into acting in accordance with its desires. 
  The third alternative is a regime of managed floating with clearly articulated rules 
and publicly announced parameters. Two sets of rules have been suggested in the 
literature. One was that proposed by Paul Wonacott (1958) as a formalization of 
Canadian policy when the Canadian dollar was floating in the 1950s. He suggested that 
countries should be allowed to intervene in order to resist the trend of the exchange rate. 
                                                 
3   See, for example, Cline (2005).   10
Thus a country could legally intervene in order to buy reserves if and only if its currency 
was appreciating, since that would slow but could not reverse the movement. Similarly, a 
country with a depreciating currency could legally intervene in order to sell but not to 
buy reserves. The trouble with this rule is that it makes little sense if misalignments 
occur, since then one may wish to magnify a trend where it is tending to correct a 
misalignment.  
The second type of rule, and the one I discuss in this paper, is a reference rate 
system. This could help to prevent large misalignments if the reference rates were built 
on a vision of a globally consistent outcome. That claim is developed in the subsequent 
sections of the paper, while here I merely describe what a reference rate system would 
consist of.  
  The concept of a reference rate was introduced many years ago by Ethier and 
Bloomfield (1975). They thought of a reference rate as an officially agreed exchange rate 
that would carry with it an obligation not to intervene (or undertake other actions 
intended to influence the exchange rate) in a way that would tend to push the market 
exchange rate away from the reference rate. Countries would be allowed to intervene, but 
only in an internationally sanctioned way—to push the rate toward the reference rate. So 
they would be allowed (but not compelled) to buy reserves when their currency was too 
strong (relative to the reference rate) and sell reserves when it was too weak. But buying 
reserves when the currency was weaker than the reference rate (or selling them when it 
was stronger) would be prohibited. The system provided a way of disciplining countries, 
although it also permitted countries to discipline markets provided that they did so in a 
way that was recognized as compatible with the world interest. Ethier and Bloomfield did 
not address exactly what concept of the exchange rate was the relevant one for defining a 
reference rate, but clearly it is what matters for the macroeconomy: the real effective 
exchange rate. 
  A reference rate system would be one in which each country, or in practice at 
least each major country, would have a reference rate. For countries with floating rates, 
they should be required to express their reference rate in terms of the effective exchange 
rate rather than a bilateral exchange rate, so as to avoid the danger that a currency can   11
become misaligned through the movements between third currencies. Countries often 
choose to have a fixed rate, however, when they trade primarily with a particular country 
(or group of countries that themselves maintain fixed rates). In this instance movements 
of third currencies are unlikely to cause major misalignments. If one wants the 
international system to sanction fixed rates, then countries in this situation should be 
allowed to express their reference rate as a bilateral rate against a single other currency. 
In either event, it would be necessary for the system to include a mechanism for 
determining and subsequently revising the reference rates. This is a subject considered in 
due course. 
 
Would reference rates make any difference? 
Before turning to the issue of determining reference rates, however, it is 
appropriate to discuss the charge that naming a reference rate would make no difference 
because the market would ignore the announcement and intervention by the authorities is 
ineffective. 
If sterilized intervention in the foreign exchange market is effective, it is clear that 
the act of naming a reference rate and imposing an obligation to limit intervention to that 
which is consistent with the reference rate would have an impact. However, it is still 
disputed as to whether foreign exchange market intervention is effective or not (see the 
contrasting views of Sarno and Taylor 2001 and Schwartz 2000, or the judicious middle 
view of Truman 2003). Personally I find it difficult to reconcile the obvious interest 
shown by dealers in knowing whether the central bank has, or plans, to intervene with the 
view that intervention is completely ineffective. Similarly, if one accepts the empirical 
evidence that concerted intervention is more likely to be effective than isolated 
intervention by a single country (a conclusion that goes back to the Jurgensen Report 
1983, was reinforced by the seminal work of Dominguez and Frankel 1993, and accepted 
by both Sarno and Taylor, and Truman, in the papers cited above), one can hardly also 
deny that intervention can be effective. The question is when it is effective, or more 
effective, and whether and when its effects are long lasting, rather than whether it has any 
effect at all.    12
                                                
Two papers presented to a conference held in 2004 at the Institute for 
International Economics seem to me to be important in advancing our understanding of 
intervention. In one of these papers, Chris Kubelec (2005) argued, and presented 
empirical evidence in support of the thesis, that intervention is more effective when there 
is a large misalignment that needs curbing. The intuition is that markets sometimes go off 
on errant paths, but that they may be pushed back toward reality by a determined act of 
the authorities. A central bank that tries to defend a disequilibrium exchange rate will be 
run over by the market, whereas one that intervenes when it is the market that has 
established a disequilibrium rate is far more likely to have an impact. It is a debatable 
question as to whether the impact of such intervention should be counted as long lasting. 
If one believes that exchange rates have a tendency to revert back toward equilibrium in 
the long run, then one would neither expect nor want intervention to have an effect in that 
long run. The function of intervention is to lessen the size and length of misalignments, 
not to influence the long run average exchange rate.
4 The view suggested by this analysis 
is that exchange rates are best determined by constructive interaction between the market 
and the authorities, rather than by either of them acting in the pretence that it is all-
powerful and the other does not exist. 
The other paper from the 2004 conference (Fratzscher 2005) argued that one 
should really be thinking of intervention as comprising two instruments rather than one: 
buying and selling foreign exchange, and also what he calls “oral intervention”. Oral 
intervention, a.k.a. jawboning, involves telling the market things like what the authorities 
believe the equilibrium rate to be (or what they think a disequilibrium rate is). One might 
expect that oral intervention would become increasingly effective if and as the authorities 
establish a track record of naming plausible estimates of equilibrium exchange rates.  
Sarno and Taylor (2001) concluded their survey of intervention policy by arguing 
that foreign exchange market intervention actually works not just through the two 
traditional channels—the portfolio balance channel and the signaling channel—but 
through a third channel too, which they called the coordination channel. The signaling 
channel has traditionally been used to refer just to signaling future monetary policies 
 
4   It follows that tests of the effectiveness of intervention that treat all interventions as equal, irrespective of 
whether the central bank is trying to reduce a misalignment or defy the market, are worthless.   13
(which invites the Truman 2003 rebuttal that if the signaling is correct then the channel is 
largely redundant and if incorrect its influence won’t last long). By the coordination 
channel Sarno and Taylor meant that monetary authorities might use intervention to 
induce many smart money traders to act simultaneously to sell a currency that is 
overvalued according to the fundamentals so as to prick a bubble. In other words, they 
are supplying information to the market, which is the same as Fratzscher envisages them 
achieving through “oral intervention”. Of course, they achieve it indirectly rather than 
directly, but also put their money where their mouth is when they provide information in 
this indirect way. But essentially both Sarno/Tayor and Fratzscher subscribe to the view 
that supplying information to the market may influence exchange rates. 
One purpose of a system of reference rates would be to increase the effectiveness 
of individual countries’ intervention policies. If concerted intervention is more effective 
when the concertation is only bilateral, then it is natural to suppose that it would be even 
more effective to have multilateral endorsement, such as would be provided by a 
reference rate system. So long as a country also sees advantage in the rate that has been 
endorsed multilaterally, then it has nothing to lose and everything to gain by participation 
in a reference rate system. The crucial issue therefore becomes one of securing that the 
procedure used to establish the set of reference rates is one that gives countries an 
assurance that the reference rate assigned to them will be advantageous for them.  
The other purpose of a reference rate system is to permit a much more focused 
process of surveillance than is possible otherwise, with the object of improving global 
macroeconomic performance. The mere fact that a country would need to have a 
reference rate endorsed by the international community as a condition of intervening 
would introduce a degree of international influence on a country’s policies that is 
currently absent. The surveillance process could also examine a country's policies for 
consistency with achieving the reference rate as well as achieving a current account 
outcome in the vicinity of that assumed when calculating the reference rate (see the next 
section).  
It is straightforward to examine whether a country's reserves have increased or 
decreased and whether the exchange rate has been stronger or weaker than the reference   14
                                                
rate. However, it would be somewhat less straightforward to make similar assessments on 
the various other policies that are sometimes used to influence exchange rates. The most 
important of these policies has traditionally been monetary policy. The question to be 
asked here is whether the policy interest rate has been set appropriately for domestic 
objectives (such as achieving an inflation target, or internal balance for a central bank 
that subscribed to a more Keynesian description of its policy objectives). If not, the 
presumption is that its deviation was attributable to an attempt to influence the exchange 
rate. One would then ask the question whether the deviation of the interest rate is 
consistent with the level of the exchange rate relative to its reference rate. For example, a 
country with interest rates lower than seem appropriate for domestic considerations 
would be acting contrary to its international obligations if the exchange rate was weaker 
than its reference rate. A similar test should be applied to various other policies that have 
on occasion been used to influence exchange rates. Thus, a country with an exchange rate 
weaker than its reference rate should not 
• accumulate  reserves, 
•  hold the policy interest rate lower than is appropriate for domestic reasons, 
•  increase encouragement of exports, or 
•  intensify controls on capital imports or artificially promote capital exports. 
An analogous list of the prohibitions for countries whose exchange rate is stronger than 
the reference rate would be to 
•  run down reserves, 
•  hold the policy interest rate higher than is appropriate for domestic reasons, 
•  impose controls on current account expenditures except for non-economic 
reasons,
5
• undertake  sovereign  borrowing in foreign currency, or 
•  intensify subsidies to capital imports or controls on capital exports. 
 
5 Examples of legitimate controls would be controls on the import of firearms or drugs.   15
                                                
Who would supervise these rules and what would happen if they were violated? 
In the first instance, the IMF staff might draw up regular reports (monthly or quarterly) 
about which countries were intervening inappropriately or otherwise violating these rules. 
Their reports would go to the IMF Executive Board. The executive director of a country 
held to be violating the rules would presumably give reasons as to why the country's 
actions should be excused. The Board might declare itself impressed, in which case the 
country's actions would be excused. Otherwise, the Board would implicitly call on the 
country to cease and desist. Some form of sanctions, such as suspension of IMF voting 
rights, might be applied to a country that flagrantly disregards surveillance, although I do 
not propose to discuss the issue of sanctions further in this paper. 
Everyone knows that exchange rates are only half the story. Surveillance also 
requires an evaluation of whether demand-management policy is appropriate. At the 
moment, no clear criterion exists as to whether a country is pursuing excessively 
contractionary or expansionary policies; as long as policies are not resulting in recession 
or inflation in that particular country, the IMF has no basis to complain, even if the set of 
policies being pursued by all its member countries is collectively inconsistent with a 
satisfactory global outcome. Adoption of the reference rate proposal would replace this 
situation with a criterion that is in principle well defined and is consistent with an 
acceptable global outcome. A country would be judged guilty of excessively 
expansionary policies if its level of domestic demand exceeded the sum of potential 
output plus its equilibrium current account deficit, even if an appreciation of its exchange 
rate above the reference rate were masking the inflationary potential inherent in this 
situation. Conversely, a country would be judged to have deficient demand if its domestic 
demand was less than its productive potential by more than its equilibrium current 
account surplus, even if this shortfall were being masked by a depreciation of its 
exchange rate below its reference rate and an enlarged current account surplus.
6
 
6 There is an obvious problem with this criterion: A country with an exchange rate that is undervalued by 
the market might be subjected to inflation if the country bowed to IMF advice and expanded demand. 
(Similarly, a country whose exchange rate is overvalued by the market, as judged by the reference rate 
calculations endorsed by the IMF, could be pushed into deflating demand and causing recession.) The IMF 
would need to be aware of this potential difficulty and request only modest policy adjustments, but one can 
hold the view that it is desirable to create ex ante demand conditions that will support adjustment if and 
when the market recognizes reality and brings the exchange rate to the vicinity of the reference rate.   16
                                                
Why should member countries take note of Fund advice structured along these 
lines when it is well known that they largely ignore such advice as the Fund gives in its 
current surveillance operations? The basic answer is: Because the Fund would be drawing 
on a body of analysis that is not available to individual member countries. Without the 
reference rates and the background of an analysis that draws up a consistent global 
picture, the IMF offers nothing more than the countries can figure out for themselves. 
Since all the major member countries have many more trained economists available than 
the IMF can deploy on any one country, it is rational to take little note of what the Fund 
says. This changes fundamentally if the Fund is drawing on a body of analysis of what is 
needed to produce a globally desirable outcome—because that analysis is not available to 
individual member countries.  
 
Calculating reference rates 
A reference rate system would require agreement on the set of reference rates. I 
discuss first the principles that should underlie determination of these rates, and then the 
procedures that might best be used to achieve agreement on them. 
  The appropriate theory to use in calculating a set of reference rates would be the 
mainstream theory embodied in the macroeconomic model used explicitly or implicitly 
by just about every central bank in the world, according to which the principal 
endogenous determinants of the current account are income and relative prices
7. Income 
is determined by the full employment condition
8 and prices inherited from the past. In 
order for this system of equations to generate a (consistent) set of exchange rates, one 
needs a (consistent) set of current account targets. One may think of these as being 
generated by the intertemporal theory of the current account (see Obstfeld and Rogoff 
1995); in other words, by savings and investment schedules in the different countries of 
the world. For developing countries and emerging markets, a crucial issue is how to 
maximize the growth rate. I argued in Williamson (2003) that a competitive exchange 
rate is a decisive influence on the propensity to invest, but there is no point in a high 
 
7  Krugman (1991) termed this “the Mass. Avenue model”, since it is the theory embraced both in Mass 
Ave, Cambridge Mass and Mass Ave, Washington D.C.  
8   Or average income over the cycle; the two will be equivalent unless some areas systematically operate at 
a lower pressure of demand.   17
propensity to invest if there are no funds (savings) to effect the investment (and vice 
versa). The growth-maximizing exchange rate is that where these two considerations 
balance at the margin. It implies a particular current account balance at full capacity 
output, which would be that inserted in the multilateral system as the current account 
target. 
  There are several different ways of approaching the task of calculating a set of 
exchange rates to use as targets. My own approach (Williamson 1994) was to appeal to 
large macroeconometric models in order to identify exchange rates that would have 
generated in equilibrium current account balances that would have matched the targets 
simultaneously in all the countries modeled (when they were all at internal balance). It 
has often proved difficult to secure convergence within a reasonable time horizon, 
leading many analysts who started from a similar intellectual position to use instead a 
partial equilibrium approach. This uses estimated trade and income elasticities to 
calculate where the equilibrium exchange rate is, given estimates of deviations from 
internal and external balance. Another approach uses an adjusted purchasing power parity 
approach, with adjustment being made for changes in factors that are known to influence 
the equilibrium exchange rate (like net foreign assets, relative productivity growth, the 
proportion of output accounted for by manufacturing, and commodity prices). The 
disadvantage of this approach is that it requires identification of a base period that was 
reasonably close to equilibrium. Goldman Sachs dynamic equilibrium exchange rates 
(GSDEERs) are estimated by a single dynamic ordinary least squares estimation for all 
the 35 countries now in the Goldman Sachs panel; this amounts to assuming that (apart 
from the country-specific dummies) the parameters of the equation (for productivity, 
terms of trade, and net international investment position/GDP) are identical for all the 
countries (O’Neill et al. 2005). Another approach, at least for single countries though I do 
not see how it could be applied to a multi-country system, is by estimating a dependent 
economy model. A single equilibrium exchange rate can also be calculated by a single-
equation reduced form estimation that makes use of unit-root econometrics.  
  The obvious location to establish an internationally agreed set of reference rates 
would be the IMF. I would envisage such a process starting by the IMF staff using their 
favored approach, or perhaps a variety of approaches, in order to generate a suggested set   18
of reference rates for all IMF member countries, or at least for the larger countries (which 
certainly ought to include the larger emerging markets). The staff would present these to 
the IMF Executive Board at regular intervals (quarterly or half yearly). Some countries 
would doubtless object that their proposed reference rate was too strong (occasionally 
one might also complain that a proposed rate was too weak). The relevant executive 
director would make this case to the Board, using a mix of technical arguments 
(challenging some aspect of the IMF's model or claiming that the current account target 
that the IMF had assigned was inappropriate or arguing that the Fund staff had 
overlooked certain special factors) and political pleading, as is customary in such 
contexts. The Board might find itself impressed or unimpressed by the case it heard 
made. Where it declared itself impressed, the staff would amend their recommendations 
accordingly, making sure that the set of reference rates remained globally consistent. The 
staff would then present their revised recommendations to the Board. If some countries 
remained dissatisfied, the process might be repeated, in principle more than once; but it 
would be necessary for the Board to reach agreement by a defined date, and it would 
therefore be necessary to agree ex ante to a process for resolving any differences of 
opinion that could not be argued out in this way. I do not see that there is an alternative to 
allowing the (weighted) majority of the Board the ultimate right to impose its views on a 
minority. 
Once agreement had been reached, the set of reference rates would apply for the 
next three or six months. They would be expressed as effective exchange rates rather than 
bilateral dollar rates, so that movements of third currencies would not distort policy. 
Rapidly inflating countries (those with an inflation rate of more than, say, 10 percent a 
year) could also have their reference rates adjusted periodically—perhaps monthly, after 
publication of a prespecified relevant price index—so as to keep their real reference rates 
more or less constant. 
In my view it would be helpful if the Fund were to publish the set of reference 
rates once these had been agreed. One would hope that over time the published estimates 
of equilibrium exchange rates would gain credibility with the market, so that if available 
to market operators they would help to make speculation more stabilizing and reduce 
misalignments. Their availability might also help to make press comment more informed,   19
so that newspapers would tell their readers whether a currency move was toward or away 
from equilibrium, rather than their present tendency to treat any strengthening of the local 
currency as good news and any weakening as bad news. Even if one does not agree that 
publication would be desirable (for example, because of fears—which I find far-
fetched—that it would promote destabilizing speculation), it is unrealistic to imagine that 
in this day and age it would be possible to keep the agreed figures secret. 
The arrangements just described are designed primarily for countries with floating 
currencies. One might hope that countries will in future peg only if their trade is 
conducted overwhelmingly with the countries to whom they peg (or countries that also 
peg to the same currency). If this hope is not fulfilled, so that there remain countries that 
peg even though the movements of floating currencies can have a profound impact on 
their real effective exchange rate, then a reference rate system could in principle call for a 
currency peg to be changed. For example, if country A pegged to the currency of country 
B and B’s currency depreciated because third currencies appreciated against it, then the 
reference rate of country A’s currency in terms of country B’s currency would be likely 
to appreciate. There would be a potential inconsistency between the peg and the reference 
rate rule. One might mitigate this by permitting continued intervention in defense of a 
peg unless the undervaluation as compared to the reference rate became too great (it 
would be necessary to decide a rule saying how large a disequilibrium should be 
tolerated), but at some point the international system would have to insist on a 
revaluation. Of course, any international rule that helped the market to forecast 
impending parity changes would be a problem to the authorities—which points to the 
advisability of countries that do not satisfy the condition of trading predominantly with 
their peg currency (or bloc) allowing their currencies to float. 
In practice I would expect by far the most contentious stage of this process to be 
achieving agreement on the set of current account targets to form the basis for the set of 
reference rates. By comparison, translating an agreed set of current account targets into 
an agreed set of reference rates is a pretty mechanistic exercise. The difficulties in 
agreeing a set of current account targets were spelled out by Richard Cooper (1994). He 
emphasized that a country’s savings/investment imbalance depends inter alia upon its 
fiscal policy, on its savings rate now and how the savings rate will evolve in the future, as   20
well as on its investment opportunities. There are doubtless different views on investment 
possibilities and the evolution of saving rates, but these are essentially technical issues, 
even if difficult ones. The critical issue is the implications for fiscal policy, because a 
binding constraint on fiscal policy would indeed impose an obligation on democratic 
legislatures. Presumably anyone inventing a set of current account targets today would 
not assign a target deficit of over 6 percent of GDP to the United Sates, yet a lower figure 
would, according to most economists, imply a tighter U.S. fiscal policy.  
It would be both unrealistic and anti-democratic to try to bind fiscal policy. One 
possibility would therefore be to accept fiscal policies as they are, and adopt the set of 
reference rates that they imply. The disadvantage of this strategy is that it would mean 
foregoing any attempt to influence the fiscal policies countries adopt. One may recognize 
that international inputs to fiscal policy are not going to bind countries, but still regard the 
international implications of a country’s policies as a dimension that should be fed into 
the political process. One possibility would be to adopt a procedure like that of Goldman 
Sachs, which essentially foregoes the use of current account targets and instead forecasts 




This paper has sketched what a global reference rate system might look like, what 
its advantages might be, and how it might operate. Such a system would be consistent 
with the maintenance of the basic parameters of national economic frameworks—
inflation targeting and floating exchange rates—as these are increasingly operated in the 
main industrial countries and emerging markets. It would add merely an obligation not to 
intervene in the exchange markets (or to make other attempts to influence an exchange 
rate) in a direction that was decided by an agreed international procedure to be contrary 
to the world interest. The paper included a sketch of what that agreed international 
procedure might be. 
Such a system would serve two main purposes. One would be to strengthen the 
hand of countries that wished to intervene to limit the misalignment of their exchange   21
rates, for example because of a recognition of how an overvalued currency is capable of 
sabotaging a country’s growth prospects. The other would be endow the IMF with a 
framework that would permit it to carry out an effective surveillance operation, which 
might give some hope of reversing the buildup of global imbalances before disaster 
strikes. This offers better prospects than laissez-faire of stemming the current drift to 
disaster, and better prospects than an attempt to legislate free floating of keeping future 
misalignments modest.    22
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Sciences Po and CEPR 
 
“A worldwide system of reference rates” is a fascinating article. It provides a bold 
proposal for reorganizing the international monetary system on the basis of globally agreed upon 
exchange rate “reference” parities, supported by central bank interventions. As Williamson 
emphasizes, this proposal runs counter the widespread consensus that the major industrial 
countries should utilize a combination of inflation targeting and floating exchange rates. 
According to this majority view, central banks would be better off without a commitment to 
defend any particular exchange rate, for interventions do not work or at least, commitment to an 
exchange rate target only heightens the likelihood of a speculative attack. With this in mind, 
central banks should not risk their reputation on a foreign exchange target, and concentrate 
instead on domestic targets, such as the inflation rate where they can achieve better results and 
build a track record. The exchange rate will have to take care of itself. 
Such a view, Williamson forcefully argues, is irresponsible at best. Putting the burden of 
adjustment in the hands of the market ignores the deep flows that are known to plague its 
operation. This includes the persistent mis-adjustments that have been observed since generalized 
float prevailed in the 1970s, as well as the problem of excess volatility. Day-to-day changes in 
the exchange rate between leading currencies are out of line with changes in underlying 
fundamentals. Economists have discussed extensively these problems in the abundant literature 
documenting the extreme inefficiency that characterizes floating exchange rate (see MacDonald 
1988 for an early survey) and in the famous results by Meese and Rogoff (1983) according to 
which no popular model of exchange rate determination achieve better results than a mindless 
random walk model. Currency traders have a name of their own for the erratic movements in the 
foreign exchange market: the exchange rate is for them a “lost cause”.  
The problem, Williamson argues, is that there is more to these results than a mere 
academic interest. Mis-adjustment is costly and potentially damaging for the international system. 
The inefficient pricing of leading exchange rates entails losses by itself and also by its capacity to 
put the world trading system at risk, since it increases the risks of protection. The implication, he 
suggests, is that there is a need to find a way to anchor speculation and limit inefficiencies. The   25
most natural way to do it, he further argues, is to rely on publicly announced reference rates, 
supported by central bank intervention. 
A crucial implication of the proposal, therefore, is that central bank interventions – and in 
particular, sterilized interventions – can influence the exchange rate. This is a matter where the 
jury is still out despite some recent evidence contradicting the older wisdom that interventions do 
not work (see Sarno and Taylor 2001 for a survey). Williamson cites recent research that support 
the notion that central bank interventions can be effective for the kind of stabilization that his 
proposal requires. One is by Kubelec (2005) who presents empirical evidence in support of the 
thesis that intervention is more effective when there is a large misalignment that needs curbing. 
The intuition is that markets sometimes go off on errant paths, but that they can be pushed back 
toward reality by a determined act of the authorities. Other relevant material is provided by 
(Fratzscher 2005) who argues that “oral intervention” (i.e. telling the market what the authorities 
believe the equilibrium rate to be) can become increasingly effective as authorities establish a 
track record of naming plausible estimates of equilibrium exchange rates. In a similar vein, Sarno 
and Taylor (2001) emphasize the existence of a “coordination” mechanism whereby central 
banks supply information to the market, encouraging it to focus on certain parities and thereby 
improving the quality of its operation. 
Williamson’s proposal also includes details regarding implementation. In particular, he 
emphasizes that the worldwide system of reference rates would have to be backed by a 
multilateral surveillance agency in charge of monitoring unwelcome developments. Specifically, 
a FX imbalances watchdog would have to point its finger at mis-behaving countries. Williamson 
would want this role to be played by the IMF. The reasons put forward are simple: the IMF is a 
multilateral body. The IMF has expertise in international money. The IMF has experience and 
credibility with macro-modeling and could thus rely on a variety of econometric exercises to 
compute reasonable ranges for exchange rate equilibrium And finally, the IMF has superior 
knowledge on cross countries issues, and thus a comparative advantage to become the repository 
of equilibrium parities. It is thus in a unique position to encourage countries to take action on the 
basis of its indications. 
I find myself very much in agreement with several key aspects of John Williamson’s 
paper. In particular, he is absolutely right to remind us that one of the main challenges of today’s   26
international monetary system is the considerable volatility of exchange rates and scope for 
persistent mis-adjustment that it displays. While so far protectionist pressures in the US Congress 
have concentrated mostly on those countries that have failed to let their exchange rate float and 
managed it in a way that was judged inadequate (China), one should certainly ponder the policy 
reactions that countries in the world would have in the event of a severe dollar depreciation. 
Having a common, multilateral agency in charge of monitoring all mis-adjustments would help to 
identify all disequilibria arising from both inadequate pegging and erratic floats. 
Another area where I fully agree with Williamson is his discussion of the coordinating 
role of foreign exchange interventions. It is obvious from the empirical literature on exchange 
rates that FX markets are ridden with information problems that have a scope for creating “beauty 
contest” situations where agents are more concerned with guessing what other agents believe the 
exchange rate will be than thinking about what should be the equilibrium exchange rate. In such a 
setting, there is undoubtedly scope for hiring a conductor of the international monetary orchestra. 
This appointment, without costing much real resources, would have a scope for removing a lot of 
unnecessary uncertainty from the system, and would thus be tantamount to a “free lunch”. 
Historical evidence provides support to this view. The notion that reference rates can 
anchor international monetary relations goes back to an early 20
th century experiment whereby 
the exchange rate of the Austro-Hungarian florin was informally targeted to the German mark. 
The arrangement lasted between 1896, when it was implemented and 1914 when it was 
suspended as a result of the outbreak of WWI. This early experiment in reference rates targeting 
may be dubbed the “mother of all currency bands”, as it inspired economists such as von Mises, 
Keynes, and von Haberler, and through them, although they generally ignored the original 
experiment, modern analysts of target zones, who all emphasized the benefits associated with 
adopting a reference rate. 
The Austro-Hungarian experiment has important lessons for the issue at hand today. In a 
recent paper with John Komlos (Flandreau and Komlos 2006) we argued on the basis of this 
episode that the very adoption, by monetary authorities, of a currency target, induces drastic 
efficiency gains. These benefits go beyond the simple effect a reference rate can have in terms of 
stabilization of the currency. The rationale for this is illustrated in Table 1 where I report the 
results of standard efficiency tests for the florin/mark exchange rate before and after the system   27
Period
Thus I do find much appeal in the diagnosis by Williamson and in the logic of the 
proposed cure. However, I do have some reservations regarding implementation. It may be useful 
to have a monetary system watchdog in charge of tracking exchange rate disequilibria. But the 
actual implementation of foreign exchange intervention will have to be delegated to local 
authorities. The scheme will therefore have to deal with a standard agency problem. One 
possibility is that the multilateral watchdog is to exercise close stewardship on monetary 
developments, always having the last word and being able to implement the required adjustments 
eventually, in which case local sovereignty will be severely reduced. This is highly unlikely. The 
remaining alternative is that the watchdog is to act as a mere advising body, leaving much leeway 
to local policy making. But in this case it is doubtful that any speculator will put his money where 
no official body with operational capacity puts its word. 
Note: The null hypothesis that the forward premium (ft-et) is an unbiased predictor of actual 
exchange rate changes (et+1-et) implies that α=0 and β=1. As can be seen, this hypothesis is 
rejected for the period 1876-1896 but accepted for 1896-1914.  
Source : Flandreau and Komlos (2006). 
 
of reference rates was adopted (1896). As can be seen, the forward premium became an unbiased 
predictor of actual exchange rate changes after the system of reference rates was implemented. 
This may be taken as consistent with the coordination channel hypothesis put forward by 
Williamson. 
To state the fact in yet a different fashion: every exchange rate disequilibrium can be seen 
as resulting from a coordination problem: within authorities and between authorities and markets. 
Would coordinating on the formulation of adequate “reference rates” while leaving 
 


















Table 1. A free lunch? 
Market efficiency before and after the reference rate 
  et+1 −et =α +β ft ( −et)+νt+1  28
implementation to the uncoordinated actions of markets and authorities solve problems? This is 
doubtful. 
Another related item is the identification of the relevant body in charge of tracking 
disequilibria. Williamson emphasizes the role of the IMF. The IMF has undoubtedly outstanding 
expert knowledge in international macroeconomics. But had it had any capacity in anchoring the 
international monetary system on an array of reasonable exchange rates wouldn’t it have already 
succeeded in doing so? After all, providing for exchange rate stability was part of the initial 
mandate of the Fund. On the other hand, I find myself unable to think of an adequate alternative. 
One that comes to mind is the BIS. The BIS has expert knowledge and an excellent command of 
monetary policy. Moreover, unlike the Fund, it is relatively well insulated from political control, 
since its constituency is predominantly independent central banks. It may be more feasible for it 
to issue regular statements pertaining to equilibrium exchange rates. And, given that it is a club of 
central banks, such statements may carry some clout in the market. 
Yet, assuming that all obstacles have been removed and that in the best of all worlds, 
governments prove happy with that (this is a big assumption), a major question remains: why 
should central bankers predominantly worried with inflation, financial stability, and asset price 
bubbles would willingly add to their already pretty loaded plate the extra burden of protecting the 
world trading system? For better or for worse, and Williamson is right to remind us that it may be 
for worse, the most likely bet is that for any foreseeable future, exchange rates will keep taking 
care of themselves.   29
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